

Distributed Authentication and Federation Model

Multi-Plane Zero Trust Architecture (D05)

Canonical Architectural Document for
SkyDefended InfraApp v1.0.

The Fundamental Principle of Separation

AUTHENTICATION

Answers: Who is this identity and how was it validated? (D05).

Accredits identity, does not grant privilege.

TRUST

Answers: Which Engines can establish valid relationships with each other? (D02).

Based on local validation and distributed cryptography.

AUTHORIZATION

Answers: What can an identity do within a context? (D06).

Evaluated afterward via IAM/PIM/ABAC.

No identity gains privilege simply by authenticating.

Platform Zero Trust DNA

Approved Foundations

- ✓ NIST SP 800-207 (Zero Trust Architecture)
- ✓ Identity-Centric Security & Explicit Verification
- ✓ Just-In-Time (JIT) Privilege Elevation
- ✓ Decentralized Validation


We do not base authentication on:

- ✗ Private networks or topological proximity
- ✗ Membership in a cluster or IPs
- ✗ Shared infrastructure or physical location


Authentication Domain Boundaries

	Control Plane	Access Plane
Purpose	Governance of root structure and global administrative lifecycle.	Sovereign operational domain of the tenant.
Owner / Authority	SkyDefended InfraApp (NCN).	The Tenant (Client).
Daily Identity	NCN Corporate Federation (Entra ID).	Client Corporate Federation (OIDC/SAML).
Local Users	5 Sovereign Local Owners.	5 Local Owners of the tenant.
Isolation Rule	Does NOT participate in the functional operation of the tenant.	Does NOT have visibility over the root structure.

Tenant Sovereignty: InfraApp is NOT the IdP




Strict Validation of Federated Domains



**Tronjanza es no se basa en 'un login Microsoft'.
Exige validación explícita para evitar suplantación.**

Local Owners and Sovereign Resilience




Purpose: Operational continuity, recovery from federation loss (Break-glass), and sovereign bootstrap.

Design: 5 owner administrators per tenant (and 5 in the Control Plane).


Independence: Use any domain, require email uniqueness, DO NOT depend on corporate federation. Not intended for daily operation.

Cryptographic Custody and Step-Up Authentication



Custody	Step-Up
Custody: TOTP (RFC 6238). SMS explicitly excluded (NIST AAL2). Seed never in plaintext.	Step-Up: Destructive operations require recent MFA (maximum window: 5 minutes).
Encryption: Vault Transit, AES-256-GCM, non-exportable custody.	Grace Period: Configurable (0-5 days) to balance onboarding and mandatory security.

Distributed Administrative Quorum




Concept: Dual-control and 'two-person integrity' (permanent privilege reduction).

Rule: Minimum quorum 2/5 (2 of 5 Owners).

Mechanism: Server-side validation. The operation remains pending until explicit approval from independent sessions.

Application: Root mutations, irreversible actions, break-glass, structural platform changes.

Ephemeral NCN Access and Data Isolation




Just-In-Time (JIT):
Temporary token, limited scope, short TTL. Requires PIM and explicit justification.

Permitted Access:
Engine health, metrics, diagnostics, connectivity.

Hermetic Barrier:
The token does NOT allow access to tenant data, raw audit, or consent bypass.


Administrative Shell vs. Application Autonomy

Administrative Authentication



Integrated applications reuse the Access Plane as a unified administrative shell.


Applications with External Users




Maintain total autonomy over login, sign-up, and session management of their final and external clients.

Principle: Administration centralizes identity in the platform; the final application runtime belongs to its own business model.

Defensive Layers and Resilience Posture



The Integral Security Ecosystem



Synthesis: Authentication (D05) injects identity into a system where capability is relentlessly filtered, governed, and registered.

Architectural Conclusion

SkyDefended InfraApp separates authentication, trust, and authorization: users authenticate via sovereign or federated mechanisms; Engines establish trust via distributed cryptographic identity; and all effective capacity is governed a posteriori under explicit Zero Trust principles.